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Abstract 
It has been proposed that children may fail to comprehend pragmatic aspects of meaning, even though 
they have little difficulty producing pragmatically appropriate utterances as speakers. A novel account, 
the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis, predicts that in certain cases children are in fact pragmatically 
competent both as speakers and as comprehenders and what develops with age is their metalinguistic 
awareness about accepting or rejecting pragmatically infelicitous utterances as comprehenders. In this 
paper we focus on pragmatic violations due to over-informativeness and report an investigation into 
English-speaking 5-year-old children’s and adults’ production and evaluation of referring expressions. 
Like adults, children do not over-inform as speakers but unlike adults, child comprehenders do not 
reject over-informative utterances when given a binary judgment choice. However, when given a 
magnitude estimation scale which allows for intermediate responses, child comprehenders do penalise 
over-informative utterances and rate them lower than optimal ones. The findings support the pragmatic 
tolerance hypothesis. By comparing over-informativeness to under-informativeness and other cases of 
pragmatic inferencing we propose a set of constraints that predict which pragmatic violations child 
comprehenders could be tolerant towards. 
 
 
1. Introduction: over-informing in referential communication 
 
Grice’s (1975/1989) second maxim of quantity enjoins interlocutors not to give more information than 
is necessary for the purposes of the communicative interaction. Take for example a visual display with a 
single large cup among several other objects, some of which are large but none of which is another cup. 
The second maxim of quantity predicts that Fred would optimally instruct Bob to pick up this cup by 
saying ‘pick up the cup’, and that it would be infelicitous, i.e. over-informative for Fred to do so by 
saying ‘pick up the large cup’, since reference to the cup without the adjective would suffice for 
identifying the referent in this context. If Fred did say ‘pick up the large cup’, Bob would have to 
concede that his interlocutor is not obeying the second maxim of quantity. Perhaps he is compelled to 
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be exceptionally helpful (Clark and Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986), or he has simply not checked that there is only 
one cup in the display (Pechmann, 1989). On the other hand, if Bob does not concede that Fred is acting 
against the second maxim of quantity, he would have to infer that Fred wishes to contrast the large cup 
from a non-large cup, which is nevertheless not present in the display. 
 
Of course, referring expressions (hereafter REs) are optimal or over-/under-informative relative to a 
communicative purpose. If Bob were to ask Fred ‘what is this object?’ while pointing to the cup, it 
would not have been over-informative for Fred to reply ‘a large cup’, since the purpose of this 
communicative interaction is to attribute properties rather than to single out the object under 
discussion. Let us call this the descriptive use of adjectival modification, and conversely, let us call the 
use of modification for uniquely identifying referents the contrastive use (cf. Karmiloff-Smith’s 
descriptor/determinor functions, 1979:46). 
 
There is a well-established experimental literature on the production of referring expressions in 
conditions where the communicative purpose is contrastive, i.e. to uniquely identify a referent (e.g. the 
large cup) out of a range of competitors (e.g. a small cup) and distractors (e.g. a large bowl) (see 
Deutsch and Pechmann, 1982; Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Pechmann,  1989; Brennan and Clark, 1996; 
Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus, 2006; i.a.). The literature largely documents that in situations with few 
objects and clearly distinguishing attributes, rates of over-informing are low in production. A smaller 
pool of research has investigated whether comprehenders reject or penalise over-informative 
utterances, and the emerging evidence suggests that they indeed do so (Davies and Katsos, 2009, 
contra Engelhardt et al., 2006). Overall, it seems that adults are Gricean in the sense that they avoid 
over-informing as speakers and that they penalise over-informativeness as comprehenders1. 
 
 
2. The development of informativeness in referential expressions 
 
With regard to child language development, a similar pattern to the adults has been documented in 
production, whereby children produce few over-informing expressions. In fact, studies have found 
children to err on the side of under-informativeness in their spontaneous description of object.  Dickson 
(1982) gives a review of the early studies; we provide an overview of some of the key findings in this 
section. 
 
Informativeness in referring expressions was documented by Sonnenschein (1982), who found that 
younger children (4–6 years) are more likely to produce under-informative responses than their older 
peers (7–9 years). Sonnenschein’s study suggests that children first go through a period of under-
                                                          
1
 Throughout the experimental report and discussion, the term comprehenders is used to refer to participants 
acting as off-line raters of utterances, as detailed in the methods sections. 
 
3 
 
informing, then after around 7 years begin to provide both optimal and over-informative descriptions 
when they have developed the necessary resources to engage in comparison activity and incorporate 
the resulting critical features into their REs. The redundant attributes produced by the older child group 
are claimed to be an easier type of expression to produce than optimal expressions as they do not 
require full contrastive analysis, so are common in more complex arrays. A similar pattern of 
redundancy in older children was found by Ford and Olson (1975) who elicited referring expressions 
from 5- and 7-year-olds in arrays with increasingly large numbers of distractors. The children varied 
their REs in line with the visual context, articulating the distinctive features within the concurrent array, 
suggesting that they do engage in comparisons between target items and distractors. Whereas the 5-
year-olds gave more minimally contrastive descriptions (e.g. ‘the big one’ when the target was big and 
the competitor small), the older children produced more over-informative expressions. 
 
 Matthews et al. (2007) note that young children have difficulty producing optimal referring expressions 
in complex arrays, and are likely to be under-informative; one explanation is that they do not realise 
that to refer means to describe differences. However, this inadequacy seems to be a matter of 
performance—while children tend towards under-informativeness in spontaneous referring, they can 
become more optimal if requests for clarification are made. Matthews et al found that training and 
feedback result in well adapted expressions, not merely indiscriminately longer ones, replicating earlier 
work by  Whitehurst (1976), in which modelling elicited contrastive (yet over-informative) expressions 
by children and eradicated under-informative ones. This suggests that as minimally contrastive REs do 
not widely occur in the naturalistic speech of under-6’s, these children are nevertheless able to produce 
them when trained. 
 
Such studies suggest that children under 6 years of age spontaneously produce under-informative REs, 
with untrained optimal and over-informative expressions emerging later. If there are developmental 
changes in the production of informative expressions, are there corresponding changes in 
informativeness when the child is in the role of comprehender? 
 
Although there is some experimental work on adults’ comprehension of over-informative expressions 
(Mangold and Pobel, 1988; Pechmann, 1989; Maes et al., 2004; Arts, 2004), there is scant research on 
this phenomenon in development.  Sonnenschein (1982) reports a task in which 5- and 9-year-old 
children had to identify a target group of objects using either optimal or over-informative expressions. 
The older children were facilitated by over-informing in difficult arrays but younger children were not. 
Sonnenschein accounts for this with reference to resource-limitation, i.e. retaining a model of the over-
informative expression is beyond the memory capacity of the youngest children. 
 
While Sonnenschein’s (1982) work addresses the consequences of over-informative expressions in te-
rms of facilitating comprehension in complex arrays, it does not directly address the question of 
whether in the most simple cases (such as the situation described in section  1), child comprehenders 
realise that an over-informative expression has deviated from the optimal norm. Yet whether children 
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are sensitive to violations of the maxim that enjoins interlocutors not to give more information than is 
necessary for the conversation constitutes a fundamental question in the development of pragmatic 
competence. This ability presumably underlies successful performance in the production of REs as well 
as the ability to generate contrastive inferences in comprehension and to classify an interlocutor as 
cooperative (in terms of quantity of information given) or not. In this paper we will investigate whether 
indeed 5-year-old English-speaking children are sensitive to the violation triggered by over-informative 
expressions and what ramifications this may have for theories on the development of communicative 
competence. We will do so from a speaker’s perspective, aiming to corroborate the existing body of 
research, but also from a comprehender’s perspective, where less work has been done. 
 
Since in standard pragmatic theory (Grice, 1975/1989; Hirschberg, 1991; Horn, 1984; i.a.) the ability to 
detect pragmatic violations due to over-informing is related to the ability to do so for under-informing, 
we will first look at recent work in the latter area. This will lead us to discuss the Pragmatic Tolerance 
hypothesis, which is presented in respect to over-informativeness in section 4. The novel experimental 
findings on over-informativeness from the speaker’s and the comprehender’s perspective by both 
adults and children and the discussion are presented in section  6. 
 
 
3. Scalar implicatures and under-informativeness in comprehension 
 
The production and comprehension of optimally informative referring expressions is mediated by 
Grice’s first and second quantity maxim, enjoining interlocutors not to give too little or too much 
information respectively. In the recent years, there has been a flourishing experimental literature 
focusing on whether interlocutors are sensitive to violations of under-informativeness. Such work 
investigates whether participants reject utterances which would be infelicitous if an implicature 
mandated by the first maxim of quantity is generated ( Feeney et al., 2004; Guasti et al., 2005; Huang 
and Snedeker, 2009;  Hurewitz et al., 2006; Katsos, 2009; Noveck, 2001; Papafragou and Musolino, 
2003; Papafragou and Tantalou, 2004;  Pouscoulous et al., 2007; i.a.). Most of these studies have 
focussed on a small subset of quantity-1 implicatures, known as scalar implicatures, which involve 
utterances with quantifying expressions such as ‘some’ which can enter into logical scales with other 
quantifiers, e.g. ‘all’ and ‘most’. 
 
For example, the utterance ‘some of the Smurfs went on a boat ride’ generates the scalar implicature 
that the propositions with the other, stronger terms on the scale are not the case, i.e. that it is not the 
case that most or that all of the Smurfs went on a boat ride. In the typical experimental situation, 
participants are asked to accept or reject an utterance such as ‘some of the Smurfs went on a boat ride’ 
when they have witnessed a scenario where all the Smurfs did so. It is consistently found that adults 
predominantly reject these utterances, presumably because they have generated the scalar implicature 
that not all the Smurfs did so. However young children do not reject under-informative utterances, 
presumably because they have accessed only the semantic meaning of ‘some of the Smurfs’, namely ‘at 
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least one Smurf’ without committing to whether all of the Smurfs went or not. As such, a large number 
of studies (cited above) document that unlike adults, child comprehenders do not generate implicatures 
arising out of the first maxim of quantity. 
 
Recently, Katsos and Bishop (submitted for publication) and Katsos and Smith (2010) tested both 
production and comprehension of under-informative utterances by child and adult participants. 
Participants watched scenarios unfold on-screen, and then offered binary judgments on an 
accompanying character’s summary of what happened. The critical utterances involved the character 
offering a semantically true but pragmatically under-informative summary, e.g. utterances containing 
quantifiers as in the example above, as well as utterances with noun phrases such as ‘‘the dog painted 
the square’’, when in fact the dog had painted both a square and a triangle. Production data were also 
elicited by asking the participants to answer what happened for themselves. The adults were found to 
be optimally informative both as speakers and comprehenders, producing all the relevant information 
when asked to answer the question themselves, and always objecting to the character’s under-
informative utterances. Moreover, over 90% of the 5-year-old native English-speaking sample was 
found to be fully informative speakers. However, they were predominantly under-informative 
comprehenders, rejecting under-informative utterances at rates below 30%. It should be noted that 
children were 100% able to reject false utterances, documenting that they did not have a problem with 
rejection in general. On the face of it, these findings corroborate the existing literature on under-
informativeness and children’s inability to generate quantity implicatures, but add the dimension that 
this failure in comprehension is in contrast to adult-like production. 
 
Rather than accounting for this discrepancy in terms of a genuine production–comprehension 
asymmetry, Katsos and Bishop hypothesised that low child performance in comprehension is an artefact 
of the task with which under-informativeness has been studied. The critical observation was that 
violations of pragmatics, unlike violations of semantics, do not lead to utterances that are strictly 
speaking false. As such, children may refrain from rejecting under-informative utterances in a binary 
choice task, since downright rejection is the response appropriate to falsity. The tendency to 
differentiate between false and under-informative utterances was in fact found in the adults in an 
indirect way: while all objections to semantically false utterances were straightforwardly ‘no’, many 
under-informative utterances were objected to by accepting that the utterance was true, but 
highlighting that something important was not mentioned (e.g. adults would reply ‘yes, that’s right, but 
the dog painted the triangle as well’). To investigate this apparent task-effect, a follow-up experiment 
was run using the same story materials and task administration. Children were asked to award the 
fictional character between one and five strawberries depending on how well he answered the 
question, rather than to categorically judge whether the utterance was right or wrong. Children 
awarded a mean of 1.3 strawberries for semantically false utterances in accordance with the universal 
rejection of these utterances in the previous experiment. They also rated optimal utterances 
(semantically true and informative) with 4.7, again in accordance with the acceptance of optimal 
utterances previously. However, they rated under-informative utterances at 3.7, significantly lower than 
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optimal but higher than semantically false. These findings document that children do in fact penalise 
utterances with an infelicitous Quantity implicature and as such they are sensitive to the first Gricean 
maxim of quantity. 
 
In a similar vein,  Katsos and Smith (in press) replicated children’s early failure with a binary judgment 
task, but demonstrated that children are in fact informative comprehenders in a sentence-to-picture 
matching and an act-out task, neither of which involved rejecting pragmatically infelicitous utterances. 
Thus, Katsos and colleagues conclude that 5-year-old children are informative speakers and they appear 
to be under-informative comprehenders in sentence-evaluation tasks with a binary judgment. They put 
forward the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis, whereby while children are indeed pragmatically 
competent as comprehenders, they differ from adults in that they do not consider pragmatic violations 
to be grave enough to warrant a rejection of or objection to the offending utterance. 
 
 
4. Over-informing and the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis 
 
The pragmatic tolerance hypothesis purports to explain the observed speaker/comprehender 
asymmetry for under-informativeness. However, it is yet to be demonstrated that this account can 
extend to other cases of pragmatic and communicative development, such as sensitivity to the second 
quantity maxim, i.e. over-informativeness. 
 
For the case of over-informativeness, let us return to the example where there are two displays: one 
with a large cup and a distractor which is not a cup (non-contrasting array), and one with a contrast set 
of two cups, one large and one small (contrasting array). When instructing their interlocutor to pick up 
the large cup, the prediction of pragmatic tolerance is that like adults, children should not over-inform 
as speakers: they should refer to it as ‘the cup’ in the non-contrasting array, and as ‘the large cup’ only 
in the contrasting array. With regards to comprehension, in the non-contrasting display, reference to 
the cup with adjectival modification as ‘the large cup’, is over-informative and generates a misleading 
contrastive inference that there exists another non-large cup in the discourse context. 
 
The pragmatic tolerance hypothesis predicts that even though children are sensitive to the second 
maxim of quantity, they will not predominantly reject over-informative utterances when given a binary 
judgment, just as they do not consider violations of under-informativeness to warrant a downright 
rejection even though they are sensitive to the first maxim of quantity. However, when given a graded 
rating scale rather than a binary judgment, pragmatic tolerance predicts that child comprehenders 
would penalise over-informative utterances, because they would now have intermediate points on the 
scale which can be used for utterances that are not optimal but nevertheless better than semantic 
falsity or syntactic ill-formedness. This would be because children are in fact sensitive to the infelicity 
caused by over-informativeness. 
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5. Relative penalties for over-informativeness vs. under-informativeness 
 
Having set out the central prediction, let us turn to another prediction of interest. Katsos and colleagues 
have shown that children are tolerant towards under-informative utterances in the scalar implicature 
paradigm though not towards semantically false ones. In that paradigm, under-informative utterances 
are logically true, since it was always indeed the case that the actor had interacted with the object that 
was mentioned, and reference to the object and the action was appropriate. However, let us turn to the 
referential communication paradigm and a display where there are two cups, one large and one small. If 
Fred were to instruct Bob to ‘pick up the cup’ the utterance would again be under-informative but the 
overall violation would be graver than in the scalar implicature paradigm, since failure to establish 
reference precludes evaluating whether the utterance was true or false. 
 
Thus, two different kinds of violations can be triggered by under- and over-informing depending on the 
experimental paradigm: in the referential communication paradigm where interlocutors have to 
establish reference to objects to perform certain actions, over-informing (‘pick up the large cup’) 
violates a Gricean maxim (quantity-2) but it does not preclude establishing reference and following the 
instructions. Under-informing (‘pick up the cup’) on the other hand gives rise to utterances that are not 
just pragmatically infelicitous but also fail to refer, which leads to the wholesale failure of the directive 
speech act. However, in the scalar implicatures paradigm where interlocutors are answering wh-
questions, neither over- nor under-informing prohibits establishing reference and both violations lead 
to utterances that are strictly speaking logically true. This observation leads us to a further prediction: in 
the referential communication paradigm, comprehenders should mostly be tolerant towards over-
informativeness. Instead, there should be more severe penalisation in a rating scale and more rejections 
in a binary judgment for under-informativeness compared to over-informativeness. 
 
In the following sections we present three studies that test the production and comprehension of over- 
and under-informative utterances by English-speaking children and adults with the aim of testing the 
predictions spelled out above. Specifically, the production study (experiment 1) measures the incidence 
of under-, over- and optimal-informativeness using the referential communication paradigm by both 
adults and children. Studies 2a and 2b document binary judgments and graded ratings respectively of 
under-, over- and optimal-informative REs by adult and child comprehenders. The goal of these 
experiments is to test the two predictions of the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis: (a) whether child 
comprehenders indeed fail to show sensitivity to over-informativeness when making binary judgments 
of pragmatic felicity, even though from the speaker’s perspective they are as sensitive to over-informing 
as adults are, and (b) to test whether children show sensitivity to violations of over-informativeness 
when a graded rating scale is available, in line with previous work on the detection of violations of 
under-informing. A third prediction, which can be accommodated by the pragmatic tolerance 
hypothesis but is not central to it, is that violations of under-informing in this experimental paradigm 
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will consistently be judged as worse than violations of over-informing. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. Experiment 1: production study 
 
6.1. Participants 
The child population were 24 monolingual native speakers of English, with a mean age of 5;5 years 
ranging between 4;10 and 6;5. All were recruited from three primary schools in Cambridge, UK. The 
same child sample was used for all three experiments in the current paper. 24 undergraduate and 
graduate students of various disciplines from the University of Cambridge were tested, all of whom 
were native English-speaking adults.2 
 
6.2. Experimental design 
In this experiment we measured levels of informativeness in production by adults and 5-year-old 
children. A computer-based sentence-production task was created by displaying pictures of everyday 
objects taken from Google images on Microsoft PowerPoint software. Participants were presented with 
the stimuli and were asked to instruct a fictional character to pick up an object. We manipulated 
                                                          
2
 Due to a coding error, the age-range of the adult participants is not available, but the typical mean age for 
participants from our subject pool is around 24 years. 
 
Figs. 1 and 2. Experiment 1: example 
arrays for adults. (1) 1-Referent display; 
(2) 2-referent display. 
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presence or absence of contrast set (another object of the same type which is contrasted along some 
attribute, e.g. one fresh and one mouldy apple) in the visual array, creating 1-referent and 2-referent 
displays (see  Figs. 1–4 for illustrations). The task was administered by a single experimenter and the 
participants’ responses were voice-recorded and later analysed. The method varied slightly between 
the two age groups since we wanted to make the version for 5-year-olds as child-friendly as possible. 
Owing to these slight differences, the procedures are explained separately below. 
 
6.2.1. Adult procedure 
A static laptop display showed two characters on a computer screen, one of whom had four items in her 
vicinity on the right-hand side of the screen. See Figs. 1 and 2 for example displays. One of these items 
was highlighted with an arrow, and participants were asked to state the best way for the character on 
the left to ask for the cued object. There were two practice items: one with a 1-referent display and one 
with a 2-referent display. The production study took less than 5 min to administer, and formed part of a 
longer experimental session, involving additional experiments for other research projects. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.2. Child procedure 
On a static laptop display children were introduced to the cartoon character SpongeBob SquarePants, 
who appeared on-screen accompanied by four objects. See Figs. 3 and 4 for example displays. The 
experimenter then explained that the participant should ask for one of SpongeBob’s objects. To convey 
which object they should ask for, the participant was given an identical array of objects as the ones that 
SpongeBob SquarePants had, printed in a booklet which SpongeBob could not see. The objects to ask 
for were cued by an arrow on the relevant page of the booklet. This was done so that it would be 
Figs. 3 and 4. Experiment 1: example 
arrays for children (on-screen display). 
The arrow indicating the target object to 
be referred to was included in the booklet 
display, which only the children could see. 
(3) 1-Referent display; (4) 2-referent 
display. 
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evident to participants that SpongeBob would not know which object to give them unless they describe 
it appropriately. Participants were instructed to look at all of the objects on the booklet page carefully 
before asking SpongeBob to give them the right thing. There were two practice items: one with a 1-
referent and one with a 2-referent display. The whole experiment took around 5 min to complete. 
 
As the same children took part in experiments 1, 2a and 2b, the production experiment always 
preceded the two comprehension experiments to avoid influence from over- or under-informing 
speakers in the comprehension studies. The tasks were also separated by an unrelated experimental 
task for a separate research project. Together with a sentence-repetition task from the NEPSY battery ( 
Korkman et al., 1999), this formed an experimental session that lasted between 30 and 40 min, 
conducted in a quiet area in the children’s school. The sentence-repetition task was administered in 
order to identify participants that fell below the norms for their age group and to establish whether 
participating children were typical for their age. One of the children in the original sample performed 
below the norms and so was replaced with a new participant. All of the participants in the final sample 
of 24 performed within 1.5 standard deviations from the age-appropriate mean. 
 
6.2.3. Materials 
Descriptions of the target object presented in isolation (without any other objects in the display) had 
been previously elicited from an independent group of adult native speakers of English (n = 29). Only 
items which were referred to without using adjectival or other modification in more than 80% of cases 
in this pretest were added to the stimulus lists for use in the studies reported here. This was done to 
control for the possibility that a certain attribute is mentioned simply because it is particularly salient in 
a given stimulus (i.e. a certain shoe might have looked so old that participants would describe it as an 
‘old shoe’ even when no other shoes are in the display). This would interfere with the purposes of the 
experiment where we aim to study whether participants produce adjectives for contrastive purposes 
only. 
 
For the adults, 40 items were created, each in two versions, the 1-referent display (no contrast set), and 
the 2-referent display (contrast set). These 40 items were split into two groups of 20. Half the 
participants saw the first group of items in the 1-referent display and the second group of items in the 
2-referent display; while the other half participants saw the item groups the other way round. See  
Appendix A for the list of items. The order of items within each group was pseudo-randomised. 
 
For the children, there were 24 items in total (which were a subset of the adults’ 40 items) in order to 
make the experiment shorter. Each item was created in two versions, the 1-referent display (no 
contrast set), and the 2-referent display (contrast set). The items were split into two groups and 
presented to participants in a similar fashion as to the adults. 
 
6.3. Coding the responses 
All responses were recorded, transcribed and classified as under-, optimally- or over-informative 
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depending on the visual display. For example, in the array depicted in Fig. 1, an optimally informative 
expression would be ‘pass me the apple’, and an over-informative expression would be ‘pass me the 
fresh apple’. ‘Pass me the apple’ would be under-informative in Fig. 2, with e.g. ‘pass me the fresh 
apple’ qualifying as optimal and ‘pass me the good, fresh apple’ as over-informative. On very few 
occasions, child participants used a reduced form of the noun (e.g. ‘pass me that’), or pointed at the 
entity on the screen without saying its name. In such cases, participants were reminded that SpongeBob 
could not understand which object they wanted and that they should try again. When prompted, all 
participants then referred using a noun phrase. 
 
 
6.3.1. Results: adults 
 
6.3.1.1. Quantitative analysis. The proportions of under-, optimal, and over-informative referring 
expressions produced by adults for 1-referent and 2-referent arrays are presented in Fig. 5. With 
regards to the 1-referent displays, where only two types of output are possible (optimal and over-
informative), a Wilcoxon’s signed rank test revealed that participants were predominantly optimal (Z = 
4.33, p < .001). With regards to the 2-referent displays, where under-, optimal-, and over-informative 
expressions were elicited, a Friedman test revealed a significant difference between condition means 
(x2(2) = 28.74, p < .001). Further pair-wise comparisons by means of Wilcoxon’s signed rank tests 
revealed that participants were predominantly optimal rather than over-informative in the 1-referent 
condition (Z = 4.33, p < .001), and predominantly optimal rather than under- or over-informative (Z = 
2.30 and Z = 4.12 respectively, both ps < .05) in the 2-referent condition. In the latter condition they 
produced more under-informative compared to over-informative utterances (Z = 2.79, p < .01). When 
comparing the 1- and 2- referent condition means using a Wilcoxon’s test, the rates of over-
informativeness remain stable (Z = 1.01, p > 0.3, n.s.), i.e. the adults’ rates did not differ as a function of 
the display type. 
 
Fig. 5. Experiment 1: proportions of 
adults’ and 5-year-old’s under-, optimally-
, and over-informative referring 
expressions (mean rates shown as % of all 
expressions by display type). All within-
participant comparisons are significantly 
different (p < .001 – p < .05), unless 
otherwise marked. 
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Thus, when encountering displays without a contrast set, adult speakers were overwhelmingly optimal. 
When referring to targets which formed part of a contrast set, speakers were also largely optimal in 
their referring strategies, though relatively high rates of under-informativeness were also documented. 
The rates of over-informativeness are the same in the 1- and 2-referent displays, and in both cases they 
are low. 
 
6.3.1.2. Qualitative analysis. The 56 tokens of over-informative expressions that were elicited from the 
total of 960 expressions by adults were also analysed qualitatively. Of these, the attribute most 
frequently provided redundantly was colour (48%). Type adjectives such as handheld (phone) 
comprised 14% of over-informing expressions and the contents of items such as glass of water 13%. 
Other attributes provided in less than 5% of cases were (in descending order) size, age, pattern, shape, 
state (e.g. empty), material, speaker attitude (e.g. nice) and location. The results regarding the use of 
colour adjectives accord with previous work which suggests that colour attributes are often used 
gratuitously rather than discriminatively (e.g.  Mangold and Pobel, 1988), underscored by Sedivy (2002) 
who found that unpredictable colour modifiers are frequently encoded even in default descriptions 
(where items are referred to in isolation, without competitors or distractors). 
 
 
6.3.2. Results: children 
 
6.3.2.1. Quantitative analysis. Two tokens were not comprehensible in the recorded file and were 
excluded from the final sample. The proportions of under-, optimal, and over-informative expressions 
for the remaining REs by 5-year-olds for 1-referent and 2-referent arrays are presented in Fig. 5. With 
regard to the 1-referent displays, where only two types of output are possible (optimal- and over-
informative), a Wilcoxon’s signed rank test revealed that children were predominantly optimal (Z = 4.42, 
p < .001). With regards to the 2-referent displays, children were optimal and under-informative in equal 
rates (Z = 1.09, p > .2, n.s.). However, there were no instances of over-informing at all.  
 
Thus, when encountering displays without a contrast set children were overwhelmingly optimal, just 
like the adults. When referring to targets which formed part of a contrast set, children were either 
under-informative or optimal. Just like the adults, children over-informed at very low rates overall. A 
Mann–Whitney U-test run to compare the rates of under-informing in the 2-referent display across 
groups, reveals that children under-informed significantly more than adults (Z = 3.72, p < .001). 
Children’s high rates of under-informing may be due to the same lack of comparison activity between 
the target and distractors as documented in the previous studies outlined in section  1.  
 
6.3.2.2. Qualitative analysis. The 15 instances of over-informative reference that were elicited from the 
574 referring expressions by children were also analysed qualitatively. Of these, the attributes most 
frequently provided redundantly was colour and size (27% each). Other attributes appearing just once 
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or twice in the entire data set were pattern, speaker attitude (e.g. smelly), idiosyncratic words (e.g. 
canny pan) and orientation. The results regarding the colour over-modification accord with both the 
adult data and previous work, as discussed above.  
 
 
7. Discussion: experiment 1 
 
In experiment 1 we found that neither children nor adults over-inform. Also, both groups are optimally 
informative when there is only one instance of a certain entity in an array. However, there are non-
negligible rates of under-informativeness in 2-referent displays, 27% and 55% for adults and children 
respectively. Comparisons showed that children under-inform significantly more than adults. One issue 
to clarify is whether it is possible that the reason why children do not over-inform is different than the 
reason why adults do not do so. Specifically, is it possible that the low rates of over-informing in 1-
referent displays in children are due to the fact that they generally do not produce adjective–noun 
constructions rather than that they are sensitive to the second Gricean maxim of quantity? It is unlikely 
that this is the case, because children do produce an adjective–noun construction in 45% of utterances 
in the 2-referent display, where the adjective–noun construction is the optimal response, and only in 
5% of utterances in the 1-referent display, where the adjective would be over-informative. This 
indicates that the low rates of adjectival modification in the 1-referent display are due to sensitivity to 
Gricean maxims and avoidance of over-informing rather than inability to produce adjectival 
constructions. 
 
These results from the production of over-informing expressions will be used as a benchmark for 
experiments 2a and 2b to establish whether there is a speaker/comprehender asymmetry with regards 
to the acquisition of informativeness. 
 
 
8. Experiments 2a and 2b: comprehension studies 
 
8.1. Design and participants 
In two further experiments we investigated whether children and adults detect violations of 
informativeness as comprehenders and how they evaluate them. Participants were tested using a 
computer-based sentence-evaluation task by combining Clipart Pictures with pre-recorded utterances 
on Microsoft PowerPoint software. The task was again administered by a single experimenter. We used 
a 2 2 within-subjects design, manipulating presence of a contrast set in the visual array, and presence of 
adjectival modification in the heard utterance, creating four conditions: over-informative (no contrast 
set with modification), under-informative (contrast set, no modification) (henceforth Over- and Under-
conditions respectively), and two optimal conditions optimal-1 (no contrast set, no modification), and 
optimal-2 (contrast set with modification) illustrated in Figs. 6–9. In the comparisons to follow, the 
corresponding optimal condition for Over-utterances is optimal-1 which has the identical visual display 
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(one object of the critical type) but contrasts with regards to absence of modification. The 
corresponding optimal condition for Under-utterances is optimal-2 which shares the same visual display 
(two objects of the critical type) but contrasts with regards to the presence of modification. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Comprehension was tested in two ways: a binary judgment task and a magnitude estimation (ME) scale. 
In the child sample, the same participants took part in both tasks, and were the same participants who 
had taken part in the production study (n = 24). Each task was set up separately, and each participant 
was randomly allocated to a binary judgment first-magnitude estimation second order, or vice versa. 
For the adults, different participants took part in each comprehension task, and were different 
participants from those who had taken part in the production task. Twelve native English-speaking 
undergraduate and graduate students of various disciplines from Cambridge University were tested on 
the binary judgment task (mean age 24 years old, ranging from 20 to 35 years). Twenty-four 
participants with the same profile as the binary judgment group took part in the ME task (mean age 24 
years old, ranging from 21 to 33 years). 
Figs.6–9. Experiments 2a and 2b: example arrays for 
adults.  
 
(6) over-informative: ‘pass me the small star’;  
(7) under-informative: ‘pass me the star’;  
(8) optimal-1: ‘pass me the star’;  
(9) optimal-2: ‘pass me the small star’. 
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We will report the common sections for each experiment, and then the binary judgment methods and 
findings for children and adults as experiment 2a and the magnitude estimation ratings for children and 
adults as experiment 2b. Again, the methods differed slightly between the adults and the children, so 
we will explain the procedures separately below. 
 
8.1.1. Procedure and materials 
The adults made their magnitude estimation ratings in a session lasting around 20 min. There were 60 
items in total: 40 critical items with 10 in each critical condition (under-, over-, optimal-1 and optimal-2) 
plus 20 syntactically ungrammatical items, e.g. ‘pass me the cup plastic’. These control items were 
included to ensure that participants were able to reject and penalise straightforwardly inappropriate 
utterances (see Appendix B for a list of all items). Every target item appeared in only one of the four 
conditions between participants, i.e. a Latin square design was used to counterbalance any item effects. 
The items were presented to participants in either one of two pseudo-randomised orders. 
 
For the children, there were 36 items in total (which were a subset of the items for the adults) to make 
the experiment shorter; for 18 of these items the children were asked to make a binary judgment and 
for the other 18 they were asked to rate how well the on-screen character asked for the item using a 
magnitude estimation scale. Of each eighteen items, twelve critical items were allocated to the four 
critical conditions. The remaining six items were syntactically ungrammatical utterances. The two tasks 
(described in detail below) were run consecutively, with equal numbers of participants allocated to each 
of the two orders of presentation. As a benchmark for successful performance on these tasks, any child 
that did not reject or penalise the syntactically ungrammatical utterances at rates higher than the mean 
of the optimal utterances would be excluded from the task on the grounds that they did not 
comprehend the requirements of the task. 
 
There were four versions of the experiment, comprising the set of target items rotated around each of 
the four critical conditions in a Latin Square design. No critical target item was seen more than once by 
any participant, although the syntactically infelicitous items were the same across versions. Each 
version of the entire set of items was presented in one of two randomised blocks, giving eight versions 
of the stimuli overall. 
 
 
9. Experiment 2a: comprehension with a binary judgment task 
 
A static laptop display showed two characters, one of whom had four items in her vicinity (see Figs. 6–9 
for example trials). Adult participants heard pre-recorded sound clips of one character asking the other 
to ‘pass me the [referential expression]’. The participants were asked to make a binary judgment as to 
whether the instruction they heard was natural or unnatural. 
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For the children, a static laptop display showed two characters, Mickey and Donald, with four objects in 
Donald’s half of the screen. At the beginning of the experiment the same participants as in experiment 
1 were introduced to the on-screen characters. The experimenter explained that Donald has four 
objects on his side of the screen and that Mickey wants one of them, so he asks Donald to pass him the 
desired object. The same pre-recorded instructions as used with the adults with the form ‘pass me the 
X’ were played automatically when each new item began. The target object in each trial was highlighted 
with an arrow, and the children were told that Donald could not see it. The experimenter elaborated 
that sometimes Mickey asks in a good, sensible way, and sometimes in a bad, silly way, and that the 
participant should say whether Mickey asked Donald for the object in a good or a bad way. 
 
9.1. Predictions 
Recall from section 4 that the pragmatic tolerance hypothesis predicts that children will not reject 
violations of over-informativeness using a binary judgment on the grounds that they are not grave 
enough to warrant a rejection. As such, the account predicts a speaker/comprehender asymmetry for 
over-informativeness. 
 
9.2. Results 
 
9.2.1. Adults 
The results of the binary judgment means by the group of 12 adults are presented in Fig. 10. NB the 
binary data in the graph have been plotted to show acceptances rather than rejections to allow simpler 
comparison with the positive magnitude estimation ratings presented in section 11. A Friedman test 
revealed a significant difference between critical conditions (x2(3) = 17.59, p < .001). Further pair-wise 
comparisons by means of Wilcoxon’s signed rank tests reveal that over-informative utterances receive 
more rejections than their optimal-1 counterparts (Z = 2.53, p < .05), and that likewise, under-
informative utterances receive more rejections than their optimal-2 counterparts (Z = 2.57, p < .05). 
When comparing by infelicity type, results show that under-informative utterances received more 
rejections than their over-informative counterparts (Z = 2.10, p < .05). This is in line with the discussion 
in section 5 where the two violations give rise to different kind of communicative failure in the 
referential communication paradigm. 
 
9.2.2. Results: 5-year-olds 
Every child met the benchmark for grasping the task, i.e. to reject the ungrammatical utterances at 
rates higher than the optimal ones, and was therefore kept in the sample of data to be analysed. The 
results of the binary judgment means of the 24 children are presented in Fig. 10, plotted to show 
acceptances. A Friedman test revealed significant differences between critical conditions (x2(3) = 8.97, p 
> .05). Further pair-wise comparisons by means of Wilcoxon’s signed rank tests reveal that over-
informative utterances are not treated differently from than their optimal-1 counterparts (Z = 1.51, p > 
.1, n.s.). In contrast, under-informative utterances are rejected more than their optimal-2 counterparts 
(Z = 2.36, p < .05).When comparing by infelicity type, under-informative utterances numerically received 
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more rejections than their over-informative counterparts (means of 0.25 vs. 0.11 respectively), but this 
difference did not reach significance (Z = 1.85, p > .05, n.s.). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Discussion: experiments 1 and 2a 
 
The results from experiments 1 and 2a show that adults avoid over- and under-informing as speakers, 
and that they reject both over- and under-informative utterances more than their felicitous 
counterparts when making a binary judgment. However, the children do not reject over-informative 
utterances at rates higher than their optimal counterpart, even though as speakers they avoided over-
informing. These results document a speaker/comprehender asymmetry in children with regards to 
avoiding and rejecting over-informativeness, as predicted by the pragmatic tolerance account. 
 
The wholesale acceptance of over-informative utterances by children is in line with pragmatic tolerance. 
Nevertheless, for this account to be directly validated it must be further demonstrated that in a non-
binary judgment task, the very same children that took part in experiment 2a will be able to detect and 
penalise violations of over-informativeness. If this is borne out, it will document that children of this age 
group are not too young to master quantity-2 and that their performance in 2a is not driven by lack of 
pragmatic competence. This is tested in experiment 2b which instead of a binary judgment asks 
participants to rate their response on a scale. 
 
 
11. Experiment 2b: comprehension with a magnitude estimation rating 
 
11.1. Method and procedure 
 
11.1.1. Adults 
The adult population is the same as the one that took part in experiment 2a. A static laptop display 
Fig. 10. Experiment 2a: binary judgments: 
mean acceptances by adults and 5-year-
olds. All within-participant comparisons 
are significantly different (p < .05), unless 
otherwise marked. 
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showed two characters, one of whom had four items in her vicinity (see  Figs. 6–9 for example trials). 
Participants heard pre-recorded sound clips of one character asking the other to ‘pass me the 
[referential expression]’ and then rated how natural the instruction was using a magnitude estimation 
(ME) scale ( Bard et al., 1996), with a syntactic violation used as the modulus. Participants noted down 
their ratings with paper and pen. A 5-min training session on ME judgments was administered by the 
experimenter with all participants before the experiment began. ME is a technique which allows 
participants to make fine-grained acceptability judgments by designing their own scale which has no 
upper or lower limit. All judgments are made relative to a modulus, which is an item estimated to be at 
the mid-range of acceptability. ME ratings are particularly recommended for investigating participants’ 
sensitivity to moderately mild violations, i.e. violations that are not overriding a core grammatical rule. 
 
11.1.2. 5-Year-olds 
A static laptop display showed two characters, Mickey and Donald, with four objects in Donald’s half of 
the screen. At the beginning of the experiment the same participants as in experiment 1 (n = 24) were 
introduced to the on-screen Mickey and Donald. The experimenter explained that Donald has four 
objects on his side of the screen and that Mickey wants one of them, so he asks Donald to pass him the 
desired object. The same pre-recorded commands as used with the adults took the form ‘pass me the X’ 
and played automatically when a new item began. The target object in each trial was highlighted with 
an arrow, and the children were told that Donald could not see it. The experimenter elaborated that 
sometimes Mickey asks in a good, sensible way, and sometimes in a bad, silly way, and that there was a 
big basket of strawberries to be used as rewards (depicted as a colour-printout in front of the children). 
The participants were told that they should give Mickey as many strawberries as he deserves (with no 
upper limit) for the way he has asked for the object, but that they should always give at least one 
strawberry since he had tried hard (in line with ME requiring a positive numerical rating). Two example 
items and practice ratings were conducted. The ME rating given in the practice trial was used as a 
modulus and the participants were verbally reminded of this rating throughout the experiment. 
 
11.2. Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 11. Experiment 2b: magnitude 
estimation (z-transformed): mean ratings 
by adults and 5-year-olds. All within-
participant comparisons are significantly 
different (p < .001–p < .05), unless 
otherwise marked. 
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11.2.1. Adults 
The ME ratings were normalized (by means of z-scores) as is standard practice (cf.  Bard et al., 1996) 
and means from the normalized ratings are presented in Fig. 11. A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA for 
the four critical conditions reveals no main effect of contrast (F(1, 23) = 3.63, p > .06, n.s.) and no main 
effect of modification (F(1, 23) = .01, p > .9, n.s.). Instead, there was a significant interaction between 
contrast and modification (F(1, 23) = 21.64, p < .001). Further pair-wise planned comparisons by means 
of t-tests show that over-informative and under-informative utterances were both rated lower than 
their corresponding optimal utterances, i.e. optimal-1 and optimal-2 (t(23) = 4.90, p < .001; t(23) = 3.47, 
p < .005; respectively). Over-informative utterances were numerically rated higher than under-
informative utterances, although this difference did not reach statistical significance (t(23) = 1.08, p > .2, 
n.s.). 
 
11.2.2. 5-Year-olds 
The child population is the same that took part in experiments 1 and 2a. One child rated the 
ungrammatical utterances higher than the mean of the optimal ones, even though in the binary 
judgment task they rejected the ungrammatical utterances more than the optimal ones. This suggests 
that they did not grasp the magnitude estimation task, and so their data were removed from the final 
sample. The normalized data (by means of z-scores) from the magnitude estimation ratings from the 
remaining 23 children are presented in Fig. 11. A 2 x 2 repeated measures ANOVA for the four critical 
conditions reveals no main effect of contrast (F(1, 22 = 1.73, p > .2, n.s.), and no main effect of 
modification (F(1, 22) = .11, p > .7, n.s.). There was a highly significant interaction between contrast set 
and modification (F(1, 22) = 13.51, p < .001), documenting that 5-year-olds were sensitive to both 
modified and unmodified utterances in both felicitous and infelicitous contexts. Further pair-wise 
planned comparisons by means of t-tests show that over-informative utterances were rated lower than 
their corresponding optimal-1 utterances (t(22) = 2.29, p < .05) and so too were under-informative 
utterances compared to optimal-2 (t(22) = 2.93, p < .005). There was a tendency for the over-
informative utterances to be rated higher than the under-informative utterances although this 
difference did not reach statistical significance (t(22) = 1.01, p > .3, n.s.). 
 
The results from experiment 2b show that adults penalise both over- and under-informative utterances 
more than their felicitous counterparts. Numerically, adult comprehenders are also less severe towards 
over-informative than under-informative utterances. A very similar picture is obtained with the 5-year-
old children. These results indicate that 5-year-old children are in fact perfectly sensitive to violations of 
informativeness. Specifically, corroborating the findings of Katsos and  Bishop (submitted for 
publication) and  Katsos and Smith (in press), it is found that children are sensitive to violations of the 
first maxim of quantity, which give rise to under-informative utterances. More critically, children are 
indeed sensitive to violations of the second Gricean maxim of quantity which are triggered by over-
informative utterances. 
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12. General discussion 
 
First, a theory-neutral finding is that in both experiments 2a and 2b, ungrammatical utterances are 
rejected and penalised at higher rates than any of the two pragmatically infelicitous over- and under-
informative utterances. This holds for the 5-year-old children, but more crucially it also holds for the 
fully competent adult group as well. The fact that pragmatic violations are treated differently than 
violations of syntactic well-formedness documents that the constructions under investigation are 
subject to psycholinguistically as well as linguistically distinct types of rules. 
 
With regard to the critical question we set out to address, whether children are sensitive to the second 
maxim of quantity as speakers and comprehenders the picture that emerges from experiments 1, 2a 
and 2b together is that like adults, children avoid over-informing as speakers (experiment 1), but unlike 
adults they do not reject over-informative utterances in comprehension when given a binary judgment 
(experiment 2a). However, this was not the case because they were too young to master the second 
Gricean maxim of quantity altogether: when given a magnitude estimation scale in experiment 2b, the 
same children penalised over-informative utterances less than semantically false ones but more than 
optimal ones. Our findings are straightforwardly accommodated within the pragmatic tolerance 
hypothesis which predicts that young children do not treat pragmatic violations as grave enough to 
warrant a rejection when the only option is a binary acceptance or rejection. However, when given a 
range of responses where children can select intermediate responses, they clearly show a penalisation 
for over-informativeness. 
 
Furthermore, it was found that both in the binary and the magnitude estimation task, and both in adults 
and children, under-informative utterances are rejected more and penalised more severely than over-
informative utterances in the paradigm that we used. This is in line with the prediction that pragmatic 
violations that preclude establishing reference are treated as more severe than pragmatic violations 
that result to otherwise felicitous (in the sense of establishing reference) and logically true utterances. 
This finding contributes to a list of constraints on when children should be tolerant towards pragmatic 
infelicity: Recall, that using the scalar implicature paradigm, Katsos and colleagues document that 
children are tolerant towards violations of under-informativeness which do not lead to a breakdown of 
reference assignment, but that this is not the case when using the referential communication paradigm, 
where under-informativeness leads to reference assignment failure. Children are also found to display 
tolerance to over-informativeness in referential communication, where the infelicity does not impede 
reference establishment. Moreover, it is found that children are not tolerant whatsoever towards 
semantic falsity (Katsos and Bishop, submitted for publication; Katsos and Smith, in press), and syntactic 
ungrammaticality (present study). As such, this account predicts tolerance towards violations that are 
exclusively pragmatic in nature, and moreover only in cases where the pragmatic violation does not 
preclude success with fundamental aspects of the speech act, such as reference assignment. 
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In our review of the literature on the development of informativeness in referential communication in 
section  2, two patterns emerged: spontaneous under-informativeness in under-6’s ( Sonnenschein, 
1982; Matthews et al., 2007), and increased over-informativeness after the seventh year ( 
Sonnenschein, 1982; Ford and Olson, 1975). In our sample, 5-year-olds under-specified the target in the 
presence of a contrast set (2-referent condition) in 55% of trials (numerically but not statistically more 
than the incidence of optimal REs) which corroborates the previous findings. Moreover, they did not 
produce over-informative REs in the presence of a contrast set. It is possible that redundancy of this 
type may indeed emerge later on in development, to level out at around 6% in the adult population. 
 
In comprehension, previous work by Sonnenschein (1982) reveals that younger children are hindered by 
over-informative REs in complex displays. Although Sonnenschein’s approach does not share the same 
theoretical assumptions as the current study, it may have been the same emerging sensitivity to non-
default, over-informative expressions which we elicited in our ratings studies which impeded the 5-
year-olds in identifying targets in Sonnenschein’s study. However, the differences in the materials used 
and task performed hinder a full comparison with the present study. 
 
13. Conclusions 
 
In their aims to develop and test the emerging pragmatic tolerance hypothesis, the results of the 
present study and its forerunners suggest that the production/comprehension asymmetry apparent on 
administering binary judgment tasks with children is an experimental artefact. However, prima facie, 
children’s adult-like adherence to the second quantity maxim in production and their seeming 
insensitivity to its violation in comprehension might lead one to turn to an account such as Interface 
Asymmetry (Reinhart, 2004, 2006). Reinhart’s account of phenomena at the interface of the 
computational system and pragmatics indeed predicts no delays to arise in production while 
comprehension is said to be compromised due to working memory limitations concerning reference-set 
computation (see also  Hendriks and Koster, this issue for an overview). Applied to the phenomenon 
with which we are concerned, namely the sensitivity to and comprehension of over-informative 
utterances, the interface asymmetry account predicts that even if children are able to generate the 
reference-set of under- and optimally informative referring expressions as comparisons to the heard 
over-informative counterpart, they would reject the over-informative expressions at chance levels by 
resorting to guessing or fixed-response strategies. However, against the predictions of the interface 
asymmetry account, our child participants wholesale accepted over-informative utterances rather than 
rejecting them at rates of around 50%. Moreover, this was not the case because they were too young to 
master the second Gricean maxim of quantity altogether: when given a magnitude estimation scale in 
experiment 2b, the same children did penalise over-informative utterances. Thus, interface asymmetry 
cannot account for the results presented in our studies. 
 
Finally, we will further briefly touch upon two issues: The first is methodological and it pertains to the 
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tasks that are not susceptible to pragmatic tolerance and therefore are most recommended for 
revealing children’s actual competence. It should be clarified that the juxtaposition of a binary 
judgment task with a magnitude estimation scale in the present does not in any way mean that a 
magnitude estimation scale is necessarily the preferred non-binary judgment task to be used. Act-out 
tasks, sentence-to-picture matching tasks (such as the ones reported in Katsos and Smith) and even 
more indirect tasks such as eye-tracking during comprehension all have in common the fact that they 
do not coerce children’s competence to manifest into a binary judgment. Magnitude estimation scale 
ratings include a metalinguistic component (since participants do not just have to detect a violation but 
also to evaluate how severe it is), so, if anything, it is preferred less than the other non-metalinguistic 
tasks. 
 
The remaining (and central) question for pragmatic tolerance concerns what exactly develops with 
time, turning tolerant children into intolerant adults? Since judgment tasks have a metalinguistic 
component, and force a binary choice, a key skill that develops with age ought to be the metalinguistic 
awareness that even slight violations of meaning (pragmatics) ought to be rejected or objected to in a 
similar fashion as violations of truth (semantics) and well-formedness (syntax). Alternatively, it could be 
that children accept pragmatic infelicity in binary choice because they cannot actively introduce a third 
category, distinct from false and optimal. Recall that the adults in Katsos and Bishop’s binary judgment 
study often indicated that under-informative utterances where right but also somehow lacking (making 
comments such as ‘that’s right, but . . .’ or that was ‘half right, half wrong’). It could be that children are 
following the same tendency which prompts adults to accept the pragmatically infelicitous utterance 
but they lack the adult ability to conceptualise how to further express that something is missing. 
Clearly, more conceptual and empirical work is required to address this issue. 
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Appendix A. Sample items for experiment 1 (adult version) 
 
Item Target Competitor (2-referent   Optimal referring 
  condition only)   expression 
      
1-ref01 thin nail fork apple cat the nail 
1-ref02 tall boot carrot tree microphone the boot 
1-ref03 new phone bike compass feather the phone 
1-ref04 old computer watch guitar mirror the computer 
1-ref05 intact egg onion camera hairdryer the egg 
1-ref06 closed umbrella onion ice-cream stool the umbrella 
1-ref07 open book hamburger fish teddy the book 
1-ref08 unsliced bread toothbrush toad pineapple the bread 
1-ref09 unlit cigarette tiger plane soap the cigarette 
1-ref10 modern rug banana crab toaster the rug 
1-ref11 banana cube fork watch the banana 
1-ref12 comb onion hamburger toothbrush the comb 
1-ref13 hammer apple tiger tree the hammer 
1-ref14 pear camera ice-cream guitar the pear 
1-ref15 sausage toad plane crab the sausage 
1-ref16 boat cat microphone feather the boat 
1-ref17 drum stool hairdryer teddy the drum 
1-ref18 corkscrew toaster duck soap the corkscrew 
1-ref19 flower razor anchor drum the flower 
1-ref20 onion cup fridge vase the onion 
2-ref01 closed bag open bag strawberry zebra the closed bag 
2-ref02 old newspaper recent newspaper cherry dog the old newspaper 
2-ref03 stripy cup spotty cup tv cucumber the stripy cup 
2-ref04 new phone old phone hat flower 
the modern/cordless 
phone 
2-ref05 sleeping baby feeding baby butterfly tap the sleeping baby 
2-ref06 full glass empty glass iron broom the full glass 
2-ref07 long skirt short skirt football toilet the long skirt 
2-ref08 short sock long sock spoon lobster the short sock 
2-ref09 tall vase short vase key bus the tall vase 
2-ref10 small star big star house chick the small star 
2-ref11 glass mug china mug duck corkscrew the glass mug 
2-ref12 adult penguin baby penguin razor lamp the adult penguin 
2-ref13 square pan round pan pear fridge the square pan 
2-ref14 fresh apple rotten apple comb sausage the fresh apple 
2-ref15 dry stone wet stone cup door the dry stone 
2-ref16 tall jug short jug kettle panda the tall jug 
2-ref17 big cookie small cookie anchor hammer the big cookie 
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2-ref18 big cube small cube drum vase the big cube 
2-ref19 small hat big hat shoe cube the small hat 
2-ref20 small anchor big anchor drum boat the small anchor 
 
 
Appendix B.  Sample items for experiment 2a and 2b (adult version) 
 
Item Target Competitor   Utterance: Pass me the X 
  (contrast conditions only)    
     
Under-informative     
und01 long skirt short skirt football toilet the skirt 
und02 closed bag open bag strawberry zebra the bag 
und03 old newspaper recent newspaper cherry dog the newspaper 
und04 short sock long sock lobster spoon the sock 
und05 stripy cup spotty cup tv cucumber the cup 
und06 tall vase short vase key bus the vase 
und07 new phone old phone hat flower the phone 
und08 small star big star house chick the star 
und09 sleeping baby feeding baby butterfly tap the baby 
und10 full glass empty glass iron broom the glass 
Over-informative     
over01 thin nail fork apple cat the thin nail 
over02 tall boot carrot tree microphone the tall boot 
over03 new phone bike compass feather the modern phone 
over04 old computer watch guitar mirror the old computer 
over05 intact egg onion camera hairdryer the unbroken egg 
over06 closed umbrella onion ice-cream stool the closed umbrella 
over07 open book hamburger fish teddy the open book 
over08 unsliced bread toothbrush toad pineapple the unsliced bread 
over09 unlit cigarette tiger plane soap the unlit cigarette 
over10 modern rug banana crab toaster the modern rug 
C: optimal + no contrast 
(opt1)     
opnocon01 banana cube fork watch the banana 
opnocon02 comb onion hamburger toothbrush the comb 
opnocon03 hammer apple tiger tree the hammer 
opnocon04 pear camera ice-cream guitar the pear 
opnocon05 sausage toad plane crab the sausage 
opnocon06 boat cat microphone feather the boat 
opnocon07 drum stool hairdryer teddy the drum 
opnocon08 corkscrew toaster duck soap the corkscrew 
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opnocon09 flower razor anchor drum the flower 
opnocon10 onion cup fridge vase the onion 
D: optimal + contrast (opt2)     
opcon01 tall jug short jug kettle panda the tall jug 
opcon02 glass mug china mug duck corkscrew the glass mug 
opcon03 adult penguin baby penguin razor lamp the adult penguin 
opcon04 square pan round pan pear fridge the square pan 
opcon05 fresh apple rotten apple comb sausage the fresh apple 
opcon06 big cookie small cookie anchor hammer the big cookie 
opcon07 big cube small cube drum vase the big cube 
opcon08 big hat small hat shoe cube the small hat 
opcon09 small anchor big anchor drum boat the small anchor 
opcon10 dry stone wet stone cup door the dry stone 
Fillers      
Clefts      
f1 big circle small circle cube hammer the big circle, pass me 
f2 open door closed door carrot cat the open door, pass me 
f3 cookie tree feather compass the cookie, pass me 
f4 hairdryer bike microphone mirror the hairdryer, pass me 
f5 Kettle watch guitar onion the kettle, pass me 
Zero article      
f6 short sock long sock camera elephant pass me short sock 
f7 big bottle small bottle fish hamburger pass me big bottle 
f8 feather ice-cream pineapple toothbrush pass me feather 
f9 pineapple banana toilet toad pass me pineapple 
f10 onion tiger plane soap pass me onion 
Adjective–noun reversal     
f11 plastic cup paper cup stool teddy pass me the cup plastic 
f12 tall jug small jug toaster strawberry pass me the jug tall 
f13 broken chair intact chair cherry crab pass me the chair broken 
f14 closed eye open eye giraffe spoon pass me the eye closed 
f15 wooden table glass table pencil candle 
pass me the table 
wooden 
 
Scrambled word order     
f16 small shoe big shoe chick bus me shoe pass small the 
f17 big car small car house key me car pass big the 
f18 teddy cucumber hotdog iron me teddy pass the 
f19 soap hat tap flower me soap pass the 
f20 watch cake football dog me watch pass the 
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